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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2)(j).
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the trial court err in ruling that the limitation of a therapist's duty to warn under
Utah Code Ann. § 78- 14a-102(1) barred all claims against the defendant arising out of an
injury caused by the violent behavior of a patient, including claims arising out of negligent
performance of an affirmative act?
Preservation: This issue was addressed in defendant's memorandum and reply
memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss (R. 15; R. 70), and in plaintiffs'
memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss. (R. 36.)
Standard of review: The motion was filed and briefed as a motion to dismiss under
U.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). "A trial court's decision granting a rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a
complaint... is a question of law that we review for correctness, giving no deference to
the trial court's ruling." Oakwood Vill L.L.C. v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101,^[ 9, 104
P.3d 1226. "A dismissal is a severe measure and should be granted by the trial court only
if it is clear that a party is not entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be
proved in support of its claim." Colman v. Utah State LandBd, 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah
1990).
In its memorandum decision, the trial court stated, "As it is necessary for the Court
to analyze facts not found in the pleadings, Defendant's motion will be treated as a
motion for summary judgment." (R. 109.) The court did not specify the facts to which it
1

referred, but presumably it was the call to dispatch that forms the basis of the complaint.
Plaintiffs are not certain that listening to a call that is referenced and incorporated in the
complaint converts a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. In any event,
however, when reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the Court analyzes the facts and
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.

The trial court's decision is reviewed for correctness.

Swan Creek Village

Homeowners Ass'n v. Warm, 2006 UT 22,H 16,134 P.3d 1122.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-102(l):
A therapist has no duty to warn or take precautions to provide protection from any
violent behavior of his client or patient, except when that client or patient
communicated to the therapist an actual threat of physical violence against a
clearly identified or reasonably identifiable victim. That duty shall be discharged
if the therapist makes reasonable efforts to communicate the threat to the victim,
and notifies a law enforcement officer or agency of the threat.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
This action arose when Officer Mark Robinson was shot by a patient while at the
defendant clinic. Plaintiffs filed their action on January 30, 2006, alleging that plaintiff
Mark Robinson was injured because defendant affirmatively misstated during a telephone
call that the patient had no weapons. (R. 4.)
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss under U.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) on February 14,
2006, arguing that the defendant had no duty to protect Officer Robinson. (R. 12.)
2

Before plaintiffs response was due, defendant filed a Supplemental Citation of Authority
in support of its motion to dismiss, citing the trial court to Fordham v. Oldroyd, 2006 UT
App 50, 131 P3d 280, in which the Court of Appeals adopted the professional-rescuers'
rule ("fireman's rule") in Utah.

(R. 32.) Plaintiffs subsequently filed an opposing

memorandum (R. 36), and defendant filed a reply. (R. 70.) No discovery has been
undertaken in the case.
The trial court heard oral argument on May 22, 2006. During the oral argument
process, the dispatch call referenced in the complaint was made available to the court.
On July 18, 2006, the trial court issued a memorandum decision granting the
defendant's motion to dismiss. (Because it had considered "facts outside the complaint,"
presumably the dispatch call, the court stated that it was treating the motion as one for
summary judgment.) "The issue before the Court is whether Utah Code Annotated
('UCA') § 78-14a-102(l) absolves Defendant of any liability by removing Defendant's
duty to warn the officers or protect them from violent behavior by the patient," the court
stated. (R. 94.) The court held that it did, because the plaintiffs alleged only a negligent,
not intentional, misrepresentation. (R. 96-97.)
After the memorandum decision was issued, the defendant submitted a proposed
order that included an additional ground not contained within the trial court's ruling. The
defendant's proposed order included language purporting to hold that "the duty of a
citizen seeking assistance from a peace officer is limited by public policy," and
incorporating all arguments in defendants' memoranda. (R. 104.) Plaintiffs objected to
3

the proposed order on the grounds that it went beyond the court's reasoning, which was
limited to the effect of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-102(1). (R. 105.) On November 27,
2006, the trial court signed the order proposed by plaintiffs, which eliminated the "public
policy" argument raised by defendant. (R. 111-113.)
Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal on December 21,2006. (R. 115.)
Statement of Facts
The facts alleged by plaintiff, and reasonable inferences therefrom, may be
summarized thus:
On October 4, 2002, plaintiff Mark Robinson was on duty in his capacity as an
officer with the Logan City Police Department. (R. 5, % 7.) Defendant Mount Logan
Clinic called dispatch and asked for officers to transport a suicidal patient, Craig Garrett,
from the clinic to a behavioral health unit at Logan Regional Hospital. In response to the
request, plaintiff Mark Robinson and fellow Officer Shand Nazer were dispatched to
escort Mr. Garrett. (Id,% 8.)
Charlotte Harris, a therapist at Mount Logan Clinic who was treating Mr. Garrett,
knew, or should have known, that Mr. Garrett had a criminal history that included use of
firearms and a domestic violence conviction. (R. 5, ^f 9.) Harris also had the following
information at the time of the Clinic's call to the police department:
•

Mr. Garrett had waved a gun around in front of his wife and children
at home, while making threats to kill himself.

4

•

Mr. Garrett sometimes kept a gun in his truck and, before going into
the clinic on the date of the shooting, October 4, 2002, he said he
needed to go back to his truck.

•

Mr. Garrett was asked by Harris if he had a weapon and refused to
deny that he was carrying a gun. Rather, he replied, "Maybe I do,
maybe I don't."

(R. 5,1f 10.)
In spite of this knowledge, when the dispatcher specifically requested information
regarding whether Mr. Garrett possessed a weapon, defendant said that he did not. (R. 6,
f 11.)1 The Clinic acknowledges that this statement was incorrect. (R. 76.)
When plaintiff and Officer Nazer entered Mr. Garrett's room, he immediately
became confrontational. (R. 6, f 12.) It was only after the officers had entered Mr.
Garrett's room that Harris finally told them that, contrary to her earlier representation, Mr.
Garrett might have a weapon. She then left the room. (M, % 13.)
Mr. Garrett then tried to leave the room by charging past Officer Nazer. In the
ensuing scuffle, Nazer realized that Mr. Garrett had a handgun. (R. 6, ^J 14.) In the
attempt to disarm Mr. Garrett, plaintiff Robinson was shot in the foot, causing him severe
and permanent injuries. (R. 7, f 15.)

The trial court's decision appears to quote the dispatch call when it relates the exchange
as: Dispatcher: "He doesn't have any weapons or anything like that?" A: "No." (R.
93.)
5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There is a fundamental difference in the law between a failure to act and an
affirmative act. As a general rule, a person has no duty to warn or protect others unless a
special relationship exists between them. An affirmative act, however, inherently carries
with it a duty of reasonable care.
Plaintiffs' claims are based on an affirmative act by the defendant Clinic, Le.,
making a critical misstatement that the patient the Clinic wanted transported did not have
any weapons. When summoning police orfirefightersto a scene, individuals have a duty
not to mislead officials about the nature of the hazard. This concept is so well entrenched
in the law that it has long been recognized as an exception to the "firefighter's rale" that
limits liability to professional rescuers.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-102(1) says that, except in specified circumstances, a
therapist owes no duty to warn or take precautions to protect others from violent patients.
In relying on Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-102(1) to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims, the trial
court erroneously assumed that plaintiffs' theories were based upon an alleged failure to
act (warn, protect), rather than on a negligently performed affirmative act. The statute
has no application to the plaintiffs' claims, and the judgment should be reversed.

6

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT UTAH CODE
ANN, § 78-14a-102(l) BARS PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS BASED UPON
THE ALLEGEDLY NEGLIGENT PERFORMANCE OF AN
AFFIRMATIVE ACT, RATHER THAN UPON AN ALLEGED
FAILURE TO ACT.
Defendant's motion to dismiss was based on the sole ground that Mount Logan did
not owe plaintiffs a duty of care. (R. 12.) In particular, the Clinic argued that it had "no
duty to warn or take precautions to provide protection from any violent behavior of his
client or patient" (citing Utah Code Ann. § 78- 14a-102), and that "[a] person generally
has no duty to protect another from harm inflicted by a third person" under the common
law. (R. 19-29.)
Before addressing this issue, it is important to clarify what plaintiffs are claiming
as a basis for recovery, and what they are not. Plaintiffs do not claim that the Clinic
breached a duty to warn or take precautions to protect Officer Robinson from the patient's
violent behavior, or from harm inflicted by the patient. What plaintiffs do claim is that,
regardless of whether it initially had any duty to act, when it did act, it had a duty to do so
in a non-negligent manner.
The California Court of Appeal has found similar allegations sufficient to state a
claim for negligence. In Boon v. Rivera, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 276, 80 Cal.App.4th 1322
(2000), the defendant summoned police to her residence when her husband barricaded
himself within their home. The defendant affirmatively misstated to the police that her
husband t4was not violent," even though she knew that he had access to guns and had
7

threatened to kill the first police officer who arrived. Relying on the representation that
the husband was not violent, the plaintiff officer "responded with nonlethal force. If he
had been told the true facts about the threat, he would have responded with different
tactics and with lethal force." Instead, the husband was able to pull a gun and shoot the
plaintiff before surrendering. 80 Cal.App.4th at 1326.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. On appeal, the parties
disagreed on whether the court's ruling was based on the so-called "firefighter's rule," or
rather on the absence of a duty. Accordingly, the appellate court addressed both issues.
The court first held that the firefighter's rule would not bar the plaintiffs claims because
the claims were not based on conduct that necessitated calling the police in the first place,
but rather "on misrepresentation of a known hazard to which emergency personnel were
summoned." Id. at 1328; see also id. at 1329 (firefighter's rule did not bar claims that
defendant "misstated material facts" to officer).

The firefighter's rule has never

immunized defendants from liability in that circumstance, the court noted.
The court next addressed the issue of whether the defendant owed a duty to the
plaintiff police officer. The court first noted that all persons have a general duty to use
due care to avoid injury to others. Id. at 1330. (Although the duty is set forth in statute, it
is essentially just a codification of the common law.) The court then noted that one
section of the statute expressly "reimpos[es] a duty of ordinary care . . . which would
otherwise be abrogated by the firefighter's rule." Id. Thus, the court noted, a duty of
reasonable care was owed to the police officer the same as to other individuals.
8

Accordingly, the court then proceeded to examine the plaintiffs claim under ordinary
duty principles.
Like the Clinic in this case, the defendant in Boon argued that she had no duty to
protect the police officer from the actions of a third party (her husband) absent the
existence of a "special relationship" between the parties. Id. at 1331. The Court of
Appeal rejected that contention, concluding that the defendant was confusing a claim
based on failure to warn with one based on affirmative misrepresentation. Id. ("plaintiffs
contend Milagro not only failed to warn, she made a materially false statement when she
said her husband was not violent"). Whether the defendant had a special relationship or
other affirmative duty to warn was irrelevant to plaintiffs claim, the court noted: The
requirement of a special relationship "has no application where the defendant, through his
or her own action (misfeasance) has made the plaintiffs position worse and has created a
foreseeable risk of harm from the third person." Id. at 1332.
"One who negligently or intentionally misrepresents the nature of a hazard to
public safety officers may be held liable in damages for injuries sustained as a result of
such misrepresentation," the court held. Id. at 1333, citing Lipson v. Superior Court, 31
Cal.3d 362, 644 P.2d 822 (1982) (defendant who misrepresented that chemical boilover
was not toxic was liable to firefighters who arrived unprepared for toxic chemicals); see
also Daas v. Pearson, 319 N.Y.S.2d 537, 540 (Sup.Ct. 1971) (party reporting occurrence
to police has common law duty to report facts with reasonable care).

9

As a final matter, the court considered an argument by the defendant that, under
the circumstances, "it was not unreasonable for Milagro to fail to provide complete and
accurate information to the police," and that "Plaintiff would have the Court believe that a
reasonable person placed in Ms. Rivera's shoes would have the presence of mind to relate
all incidents that might or might not be helpful to them, to the police within seconds of
arriving on the scene." Id. at 1334, quoting the defendant's brief. The court summarily
dispensed with that contention, noting that "whether or not certain conduct was
unreasonable" is normally a question of fact.

Id.

The trial court's order granting

summary judgment to the defendant was reversed.
In this case, plaintiffs allege that defendant performed a negligent act in misstating
a critical fact, namely that the patient did not have any weapons. As recognized in Boon,
the approach taken by an officer is quite different depending on whether the third party is
believed to be armed. The Clinic knew that the police would rely on its reassurance, and
plaintiff did so to his detriment.
The court below, however, held that Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-102 barred all of
plaintiffs' claims, stating: "Because there was no intentional misrepresentation by the
employee, Defendant's duty to warn the officers was removed by UCA § 78-14a-102(l)."
(R. 96.) In so holding, the trial court misapprehended the nature of plaintiffs' claims,
which are not based upon an alleged failure to warn. Rather, the court blurred the critical
distinction between "acts" and "omissions" under Utah law. As this Court recently stated,

10

[tjhe court of appeals correctly observed that as a general proposition of tort law,
the distinction between acts and omissions is central to assessing whether a duty is
owed a plaintiff. In almost every instance, an act carries with it a potential duty
and resulting legal accountability for that act. By contrast, an omission or failure
to act can generally give rise to liability only in the presence of some external
circumstance—a special relationship.
Webb v. University of Utah, 2005 UT 80, % 10, 125 P.3d 906.
In the court below, the Clinic repeatedly characterized plaintiffs' complaint as
alleging a failure to protect, which, had it been true, would fall into the failure-to-act
category. See Webb, 2005 UT 80, % 15 ("Generally, the duty to protect is allied with the
failure-to-act element of general negligence law. The duty of a private citizen to act in
aid of another, the duty to protect, arises only where a special relationship is found to
exist.") But that is not the theory by which plaintiffs claim a right to recover. As this
Court has pointed out, "[U]nder ordinary negligence principles, the duty-to-protect
concept has no application where a duty arises from an affirmative act." Id (emphasis
added.)
The common law has always distinguished between acting and failing to act. The
Restatement provides some historical background:
The origin of the rule [that generally there is no duty to protect others] lay in the
early common law distinction between action and inaction, or "misfeasance" and
"non-feasance." In the early law one who injured another by a positive affirmative
act was held liable without any great regard even for his fault. But the courts were
far too much occupied with the more flagrant forms of misbehavior to be greatly
concerned with one who merely did nothing, even though another might suffer
serious harm because of his omission to act. Hence liability for non-feasance was
slow to receive any recognition in the law. It appeared first in, and is still largely
confined to, situations in which there was some special relation between the
11

parties, on the basis of which the defendant was found to have a duty to take action
for the aid or protection of the plaintiff.
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 314 cmt. c.
Every person who performs an affirmative act owes a duty not to injure others by
performing the act negligently:
In general, anyone who does an affirmative act is under a duty to others to exercise
the care of a reasonable man to protect them against an unreasonable risk of harm
to them arising out of the act. The duties of one who merely omits to act are more
restricted, and in general are confined to situations where there is a special relation
between the actor and the other which gives rise to the duty.
Id9 § 302 cmt. a.
These observations are consistent with the well-established principle that a party
who assumes a duty not otherwise owed must do so in a non-negligent manner. "The
common law recognizes a duty of due care on the part of an individual or entity that
undertakes, whether gratuitously or for consideration, to perform a duty. . . . "Where one
undertakes an act which he has no duty to perform and another reasonably relies upon that
undertaking, the act must generally be performed with ordinary or reasonable care.'"
Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 573 (Utah 1996) (stating that court did not have to
decide whether city had duty to erect fence in waterway; once it chose to do so, city had
duty to use reasonable care), quoting AmJur.2d Negligence § 208, at 255 (1989);
Atkinson v. Stateline Hotel Casino & Resort, 2001 UT App 63, ffif 17-18, 21 P.3d 667
(stating that court need not decide whether defendant casino owed plaintiff duty to

12

prevent harm from third party, because once defendant undertook such a duty, it had to
act reasonably).
The trial court's reliance upon Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-102(l) to bar plaintiffs'
claims was thus erroneous, because that statute addresses only the failure-to-act prong of
negligence law, which is not at issue. It says that a therapist has no duty to warn or
protect; it says nothing to exempt therapists from liability for negligently performing an
affirmative act.
Although the trial court did not adopt it, one final argument raised by the
defendant warrants consideration. In its citation to supplemental authority, the Clinic
directed the trial court to the Court of Appeals' ruling in Fordham, supra, which adopted
the professional rescuers' rule in Utah. The Clinic acknowledged that the rule would not
bar the plaintiffs' claims, claiming that 'the rule is cited only for purposes of the public
policy considerations that have convinced other states to adopt the rule as a broad
statement of duty[.]" (R. 81.) In light of the defendant's concession that the rule would
not apply to the circumstances of this case, the issue of whether it is the law in Utah is not
before the Court.
However, the policy underpinnings of the professional rescuers rule actually
support plaintiffs' position. Although varying rationale have been cited for adopting the
rule, courts have consistently recognized that the policy considerations underlying the rule
do not extend to situations in which the rescuer has been misled about the nature of the
hazard, or the conditions for which he was summoned. See Boon, supra (holding that
13

fireman's rule did not apply where defendant misrepresented to police that her husband
was not violent, after which husband shot plaintiff); Thomas v. Pang, 72 Haw. 191, 811
P.2d 821, 825 (1991) (recognizing that fire fighter's rule would not apply if plaintiff
alleged "that defendants misled the fire fighters regarding the condition of the building"),
and cases cited; Calvert v. Garvey Elevators, Inc., 236 Kan. 570, 694 P.2d 433, 439
(1985) (indicating that fireman's rule would not bar claim "for misrepresenting the nature
of the hazard when such misconduct causes the injury to the fire fighter"); Pottebaum v.
Hinds, 347 N.W.2d 642, 645 (Iowa 1984) (recognizing exception to fire fighter's rule if
defendant misrepresents nature of the hazard).
In adopting the professional-rescuer's rule, the Court of Appeals "emphasize[d]
the doctrine's narrowness; it "bars only recovery for the negligence that creates the need
for the public safety officer's service.' Therefore, the policy underlying the professionalrescuer doctrine, even if valid, 'does not apply to negligent conduct occurring after the
police officer or firefighter arrives at the scene or to misconduct other than that which
necessitates the officer's presence.'" Id, quoting Moody v. Delta Western, Inc., 28 P.3d
1139, 1141 (Alaska 2002).
None of the allegations in the complaint involve any negligence that necessitated
plaintiffs presence at the clinic. For example, plaintiff does not allege that defendant
misdiagnosed the patient or committed some other error that caused the patient to become
suicidal, thereby creating the need for police to transport him to another facility. Claims
based upon such acts might well fall within the professional-rescuer rule (if ultimately
14

adopted by this Court), because such acts would have created the need for the officer to
come to the scene.
The misconduct at issue in this case was independent of, and subsequent to, the
acts necessitating plaintiffs presence. U also continued after the police arrived, as the
defendant perpetuated its earlier misrepresentation (that the patient did not have any
weapons) until the officers had already entered the patient's room, when it was too late.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, plaintiffs respectfully request the Court to reverse
the trial court's judgment, remanding the case for trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £3d

day of March, 2007.

CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

William J. H
Karra J. Porter
Attorneys for Appellants
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Memorandum Decision, July 18,2006
Order, November 27,2006

•JUL 1 ^; 2008

IN THE FOIST DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARK ROBINSON and LORI
ROBINSON, husband and wife,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiffs,
Civil No: 060100223 PI
vs.
MOUNT LOGAN CLINIC, LLC,

Judge: Gordon J. Low

Defendant.

THE ABOVE MATTER is before the Court pursuant to the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss. In preparation of its decision, the Court reviewed the Defendant's Motion with its
accompanying memorandum, Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition, Defendant's Reply
Memorandum, Plaintiffs' Complaint, and the applicable caselaw and statutory provisions.
According to the undisputed facts, the case involves an incident that occurred on October
4, 2002. On that date, Mark Robinson, acting in his capacity as a Logan City Policeman, was
dispatched to Mount Logan Clinic. A certain employee of the Defendant ("Defendant's
employee") called Logan City dispatch in connection with a suicidal patient, requesting officers to
come escort the patient to a behavioral health unit at Logan Regional Hospital. During the call,
Defendant's employee was asked by police dispatch, "He doesn't have any weapons or anything
like that?" The employee responded, "No." After Robinson and his partner, Officer Nazer,
arrived at Mount Logan, but before the physical confrontation with the patient began, Defendant's

1

employee warned the officers that the patient may have a gun. The officers then attempted to
physically escort the patient. A struggle resulted and a gun concealed in the patient's waistband
was, intentionally or unintentionally, discharged and struck Robinson in his foot. Plaintiffs then
filed a Complaint against Defendant alleging negligence, personal damages, and loss of
consortium.
As it is necessary for the Court to analyze facts not found in the pleadings, Defendant's
motion will be treated as a motion for summary judgment. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c)
provides, "...If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary
judgment and disposed of as provided in rule 56..."
The issue before the Court is whether Utah Code Annotated ("UCA") § 78-14a-102(l)
absolves Defendant of any liability by removing Defendant's duty to warn the officers or protect
them from violent behavior by the patient.
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:
...The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law...
When dealing with statutory interpretation the Utah Court of Appeals gave the following
guidance:
In construing a legislative enactment, the court's primary responsibility is to
give effect to the intent of the legislature. Where statutory language is clear
and unambiguous, we will not look further to divine legislative intent, but will
construe the statute according to its plain language.
State v. Singh, 819 P.2d 356, 359 (UT App. 1991).
2

UCA§78-14a-102(l) states:
A therapist has no duty to warn or take precautions to provide protection
from any violent behavior of his client or patient, except when that client or
patient communicated to the therapist an actual threat of physical violence
against a clearly identified or reasonably identifiable victim. That duty shall be
discharged if the therapist makes reasonable efforts to communicate the threat
to the victim, and notifies a law enforcement officer or agency of the threat.
Plaintiffs argue that the statute does not have application in this case because there is no
claim that Defendant owed Plaintiffs a general duty to warn or protect Robinson. Instead,
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant had a duty not to affirmatively misrepresent the nature of the
hazard when summoning police and an obligation to act reasonably upon assuming a duty.
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant's employee affirmatively misrepresented the hazard when she
responded, "No" to the dispatcher's question, "He doesn't have any weapons or anything like
that?" Plaintiffs further claim that, even if initially Defendants did not owe Robinson a duty,
once Defendant assumed the duty by contacting law enforcement, it had the obligation to
exercise reasonable care.
In contrast, Defendant argues that UCA § 78-14a-102(l) removes any duty it may have
had to warn the officers because the only threat made by the patient was that he intended to kill
himself. To Defendant, there were no other clearly identified or reasonably identifiable victims,
and Defendant's employee informed law enforcement of the patient's suicidal tendencies. Thus,
Defendant claims that any duty to warn it may have had was fulfilled by informing law
enforcement of the patient's desire to commit suicide. Defendant also argues that public policy
and the recently adopted "Fireman's Rule" favor imposing no liability for injuries sustained by
law enforcement officers on those who summoned law enforcement.

3

Following the law stated in Singh, the Court must give effect to the intent of the
legislature. The statute's language is clear and unambiguous in its removal of a therapist's duty
to warn of a patient's violent behavior. The basis for Plaintiffs' claim rests entirely on the
dispatcher's question and Defendant's employee's subsequent response. Plaintiffs classify
Defendant's employee's response as an "affirmative misrepresentation." Plaintiffs made no
clarification as to whether "affirmative misrepresentation" is equivalent to negligent or intentional
misrepresentation. Negligent misrepresentation requires a mere duty to exercise reasonable care
in giving information, and thus would not heighten the duty to the point of being outside of the
confines of UCA § 78-14(a)-102(1). Rawson v. Conover, 20 P.3d 876, 883 (UT 2001). While
situations of intentional misrepresentation may exist that remove a therapist's protection granted
under UCA § 78-14a-102(1), in this factual situation, there is no evidence sufficient to support a
claim for intentional misrepresentation. Consequently, Plaintiffs have not made such a claim.
Therefore, Defendant owed Plaintiffs no duty to warn or provide protection from the patient.
Furthermore, if the legislature intended a patient who makes a threat of suicide to be a clearly
identified or reasonably identifiable victim, Defendant, through its communication to law
enforcement that the patient was suicidal, fulfilled its duty to warn.
Additionally, the question asked by the dispatcher, <cHe doesn't have any weapons or
anything like that?" is ambiguous. The question assumes that Defendant's employee knew with
certainty whether the patient had a weapon. Defendant's employee's response cannot be
classified as an intentional misrepresentation because of the ambiguous nature in which the
question was asked. Because there was no intentional misrepresentation by the employee,
Defendant's duty to warn the officers was removed by UCA § 78-14a-102(l).

4

Finally, it is undisputed that before the physical altercation between the Patient and
Plaintiff occurred, Defendant's employee informed Plaintiff that the patient may have a weapon.
Though the facts as now before the Court do not state how much time before the physical
encounter took place that the warning was given, it is undisputed that the warning was made
before Plaintiff physically encountered the patient. Thus, as plaintiffs' claim for relief is based on
the argument that Officer Robinson would have acted differently had he known that the patient
had a weapon, the warning by Defendant's employee granted Officer Robinson an opportunity to
change his tactics before physically engaging the patient.
Therefore, as a matter of law, Defendant is absolved of liability, and its motion for
summary judgment is granted. Counsel for Defendant is directed to prepare an order in
accordance therewith.
Dated this ( Q

day of July, 2006.
BY THE COURT

5

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 060100223 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Dated t h i s

\l

day of

NAME
WILLIAM J HANSEN
ATTORNEY PLA
50 S MAIN ST STE 1500
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84144
ELLIOTT J WILLIAMS
ATTORNEY DEF
257 E 200 S #500
PO BOX 45678
SALT LAKE CITY UT
84145-5678

r

aui

IOOLP

^^BefSuty Court Clerk

Page 1 ( l a s t )

William J. Hansen, 1353
Karra J. Porter, 5223
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 323-5000
EST THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MARK ROBINSON and LORI ROBINSON,
Husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.
Civil No. 060100223
MOUNT LOGAN CLINIC, LLC,
Judge Gordon J. Low
Defendants.

This matter came before the Court pursuant to the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, which
the Court treats as a Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 12(c), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Court heard oral argument on Defendant's Motion on May 22, 2006. In addition
to oral argument, the Court has reviewed and considered the legal memoranda filed by the
parties, applicable case law and applicable statutory provisions. The Court, being fully informed
and having previously entered its Memorandum Decision on July 18, 2006, finds and rules as
follows:
The following material facts are undisputed:

NOV 2 5 2006

.M
/

On October 4, 2002, Mark Robinson, acting in his capacity as a Logan City Peace
Officer, was dispatched to the Mount Logan Clinic as a result of a telephone call from an
employee of the clinic ("Defendant's Employee") who had requested police assistance to escort a
suicidal patient ("the patient") to a behavioral health unit at Logan Regional Hospital. During
the call, Defendant's Employee was asked by police dispatch, "He doesn't have any weapons or
anything like that?" Defendant's Employee responded, "No." After Officer Robinson and his
partner, Officer Nazer, arrived at Mount Logan Clinic, but before the subsequent physical
confrontation with the patient began, Defendant's Employee warned the officers that the patient
may have a gun. Officers Robinson and Nazer attempted to physically escort the patient out of
the clinic and a struggle ensued, during which a gun concealed in the patient's waistband was
either intentionally or unintentionally discharged. A round from the gun struck Officer Robinson
in the foot resulting in personal injury.

Plaintiffs subsequently filed a Complaint against

Defendant alleging negligence based upon the allegations that Defendant "breached its duty oT
care to Officer Robinson" in "failing to ascertain whether [the patient] was carrying a concealed
weapon; failing to disclose to the Logan City Police Department that Mr. Garrett had a history of
violent behavior; failing to disclose to the Logan City Police Department information which
would have put the police on notice that Mr. Garrett may have been carrying a gun; and
affirmatively representing to the police that Mr. Garrett did not have a gun."

(Plaintiffs'

Complaint, ^ 17.) Based upon these allegations, Officer Robinson seeks damages for personal
injury and his spouse, Lori Robinson, seeks damages for loss of consortium.

2

Defendant seeks dismissal on the basis that there is no legal duty owed to Plaintiffs. The
Court agrees. The Court holds that any duty of Defendant's therapist and related agents is
statutorily limited by § 78-14a-102(1). The Court holds that there is no legal duty to warn that
was breached and that Plaintiffs' claims for negligence and "affirmative misrepresentation" fails
as a matter of law under the undisputed facts of this case. Accordingly, and for just cause
appearing, the Court hereby
ORDERS AND DECREES that Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant be, and the same are,
hereby dismissed with prejudice. Each of the parties shall bear his, her or its respective costs and
attorney's fees incurred herein.

Approved as to Form:
WILLIAMS & HUNT

Elliott J. Williams
Dennis C. Ferguson
Robert C. Keller
Attorneys for Defendant
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